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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-ORDINANCE MAKING
HOUSE TO HOUSE CANVASSING A NUISANCE-A municipal ordinance'
declared the practice of going in and upon private residences
without an invitation, by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers or itinerant
merchants and transients, and vendors of merchandise to be a
nuisance and punishable as a misdemeanor. Section 4 of the ordi-
nance contained the following exception: "Provisions of this ordi-
nance shall not apply to the vending or sale of ice, or soliciting
orders for the sale of ice and milk, and dairy products, truck vege-
tables, poultry and eggs and other farm and garden produce so
far as the sale of the named commodities is now authorized by
law." Defendant was convicted of having violated the ordinance.
Held, that the ordinance was a proper exercise of police power, in
that it tended to prevent fraud, deceit, cheating and imposition,
and the consequences thereof. City of Shreveport v. Cunningham,
190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938).
The instant case is in accord with the majority rule as enun-
ciated in Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Company.2 It must
be borne in mind that such an ordinance does not denounce ped-
dling, but is aimed at the annoyance caused to householders by
uninvited solicitors and peddlers.2 It is directed not at the sale
of goods, but at the manner of their sale.4 Since the evil contem-
plated by the ordinance is the annoyance caused by peddling and
not the act of peddling, such an ordinance applies to solicitors of
wares for future delivery.'
Presumably the solicitation of out of state orders is within
the purview of the Louisiana ordinance. This is not unconstitu-
tional as a regulation of interstate commerce but has a mere inci-
dental effect on such commerce. It is primarily a matter for local
as a result of the jealousy which the judiciary entertained toward legislation.
It is unfortunate that such a doctrine has crept into Louisiana for the reason
that in civil law states all rights emanate from the legislature.
1. Ordinance No. 50 of 1937 of the City of Shreveport.
2. 65 F. (2d) 112, 88 A.L.R. 177 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933) noted (1934) 18 Minn. L.
Rev. 475.
3. Ibid. Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456, 458
(1936). The Wyoming Court said: "The ordinance in question is intended to
suppress acts having a tendency to annoy, disturb, and inconvenience people
in their homes."
4. Wardens License, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 75 (1903). See also: New Orleans v.
Fargot, 116 La. 369, 40 So. 735 (1906) (peddlers and hawkers prohibited from
crying their goods in a loud and boisterous manner in the city streets) and
St. Martinville v. Eugas, 158 La. 262, 103 So. 761 (1925) (exposure of meat for
sale limited to public market place).
5. Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112, 88 A.L.R. 117
(C.C.A. 10th, 1933), noted in (1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 475. Town of Green River
v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936).
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control. An imposition of a heavy license tax on peddling has
been held valid7 but a discriminatory tax placed on the solicita-
tion of out of state goods is an interference with interstate com-
merce.8
Several cities have passed ordinances similar to the one un-
der discussion. In considering such an ordinance recently, the
Supreme Court of Florida9 reached a conclusion contrary to that
of the instant case, holding the ordinance to be an unreasonable
exercise of the police power in violation of constitutional rights.
Other state courts have reached this same result.10 These deci-
sions seem indistinguishable from the instant case on constitu-
tional grounds. They might have been differentiated in that, in the
Louisiana case, there was clear cut statutory authority for the
enactment of the ordinance in question," whereas the cases hold-
ing to the contrary show a lack of such statutory authority. 12 The
decisions, however, do not appear to be grounded on this point.
6. Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112, 88 A.L.R. 117
(C.C.A. 10th, 1933) noted (1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 475. Town of Green River v.
Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936) (An ordinance similar to the one in
the main case was attacked as being unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
of Wyoming held it to be valid. An appeal to the United States Supreme
Court was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 300 U.S. 638,
57 S.Ct. 510, 81 L.Ed. 854 (1937). Rehearing denied 300 U.S. 688, 57 S.Ct. 752, 81
L.Ed. 889 (1937). In dismissing this case, the Supreme Court cited as authority
Williams v. State, 85 Ark. 464, 108 S.W. 838 (1908), aff'd, 217 U.S. 79, 30 S.Ct.
493, 54 L.Ed. 673, 18 Ann. Cas. 865 (1910) (statute prohibiting soliciting on
trains).
7. City of Duluth v. Kemp, 46 Minn. 435, 49 N.W. 235 (1891).
8. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 23 L.Ed. 347 (1876) (Missouri statute
requiring a license tax from persons selling out of state produce or merchan-
dise held invalid under the commerce clause); Robbins v. Shelby Taxing
District, 120 U.S. 489, 7 S.Ct. 592, 30 L.Ed. 679 (1887). Brennan v. City of Titus-
ville, 153 U.S. 289, 14 S.Ct. 829, 38 L.Ed. 718 (1894).
9. Prior v. White, 180 So. 347 (Fla. 1938) noted (1938) 23 Minn. L. Rev.
88.
10. City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S. E. 783 (1936) (Or-
dinance of Orangeburg, S.C., held to be unreasonable because based upon the
act and not the conduct of the salesman); Jewell Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air,
172 Md. 536, 192 Atl. 417 (1937).
11. The charter of the City of Shreveport, La., Act 74 of 1934, § 2, declares:
"That the City of Shreveport shall have, and is hereby given the following
powers, to-wit: . . . (7) . . . to regulate (or suppress) . . . peddlers . . ."
12. Prior v. White, 180 So. 347 (Fla. 1938) noted (1938) 23 Minn. L. Rev.
88; City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (1936); Jewell Tea
Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 Atl. 417 (1937). An activity may be
declared a nuisance only when it is such by common law or by statutory def-
inition, State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297, 48 Am. Rep. 105 (1883). A nuisance in fact
may be declared by the municipality, McQuillin, Municipal Ordinances (1904)
§ 441, p. 687, n.79; S. H. Kress and Co. v. City of Miami, 78 Fla. 101, 82 So. 775
(1919). Express statutory authority is necessary to permit regulation of an
activity which is not a nuisance per se, Jewell Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 172
Md. 536, 192 Atl. 417 (1937); Yates v. The City of Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 19
L.Ed. 984 (1870).
NOTES
Although the Louisiana ordinance under discussion is similar
to those in the contrary cases, it is of much broader scope. It goes
further and "classifies" solicitors and peddlers by excepting those
who sell certain types of produce: namely, ice, vegetables, butter,
eggs, dairy products, and other farm produce. This classification
was held not to be class legislation and therefore not discrimina-
tory. The Court reasoned that wide discretion must be conceded
to the legislative power in the classification of trades, callings,
businesses or occupations, and that "legislation which affects alike
all persons pursuing the same business under the same conditions
is not such class legislation as is prohibited by the United States
or the State Constitution." If, however, the manner of solicita-
tion or sale is the criterion of classification, it is hard to see how
the activity of vendors of farm produce can be differentiated from
that of vendors of other products not excepted from the applica-
tion of the ordinance. On the other hand, if the classification em-
phasizes the possibility of annoyance and deceit, the distinction is
perhaps well founded. It may be that the court felt that deceit
does not characterize peddling of farm produce and that, in view
of the difficulty which city-dwellers have in obtaining fresh coun-
try products, house-to-house peddling of this class of goods may
well be considered a convenience rather than an annoyance.
R.K.
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE-Is CONSENT OF PARENTS OR TUTOR
NECESSARY FOR A MINOR OF EIGHTEEN?-In the succession proceed-
ings of Mrs. Hecker, her surviving husband was appointed tutor
of the minor children. In lieu of the legal mortgage a special
mortgage in favor of the minors had been placed on two lots of
ground and, when the tutor desired to sell one of them, he ob-
tained permission of the court to substitute a United States Bond
for the special mortgage on that lot. The recorder of mortgages
nevertheless refused to cancel the mortgage on the ground that
since the minor (eighteen years of age) had been fully emanci-
pated by marriage the court could not authorize the substitution
of a bond. The minor asked for the cancellation of the mortgage
but the father and tutor contended that there was no emancipa-
tion by a marriage without his consent. Held, that under Article
382 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, as amended by Act 224 of
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